Cockles in Custody: The Role of Common Property Arrangements in the Ecological Sustainability of Mangrove Fisheries on the Ecuadorian Coast by Beitl, Christine M
The University of Maine
DigitalCommons@UMaine
Anthropology Faculty Scholarship Anthropology
2011
Cockles in Custody: The Role of Common
Property Arrangements in the Ecological
Sustainability of Mangrove Fisheries on the
Ecuadorian Coast
Christine M. Beitl
University of Maine - Main, christine.beitl@maine.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/ant_facpub
Part of the Anthropology Commons, Human Geography Commons, Latin American Studies
Commons, and the Nature and Society Relations Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Anthropology Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact
um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.
Repository Citation
Beitl, Christine M., "Cockles in Custody: The Role of Common Property Arrangements in the Ecological Sustainability of Mangrove
Fisheries on the Ecuadorian Coast" (2011). Anthropology Faculty Scholarship. 3.
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/ant_facpub/3
International Journal of the Commons
Vol. 5, no 2 August 2011, pp. 485–512
Publisher: Igitur publishing
URL:http://www.thecommonsjournal.org
URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1-101644
Copyright: content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
ISSN: 1875-0281
Cockles in custody: the role of common property arrangements 
in the ecological sustainability of mangrove fisheries on the 
Ecuadorian coast
Christine M. Beitl
Department of Anthropology, University of Georgia, Georgia, USA,
cbeitl@gmail.com
Abstract: Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long 
asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective 
action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the 
direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. 
This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements 
contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on 
the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a 
bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular 
social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend 
on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society 
institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation 
for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that 
recognized “ancestral” rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and 
how custodias, community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle 
fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-
per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property 
regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, 
mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell 
sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without custodias 
and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of 
gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to “open-
access” areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. 
Using Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the 
explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, 
examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through 
quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level 
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of the mangrove landscape. Implications for coastal and fishery management are 
discussed in the conclusions.  
Keywords: A. similis, Anadara tuberculosa, artisanal fisheries, collective 
action, co-management, common property, community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM), Ecuador, social-ecological systems, sustainability, 
mangroves
Acknowledgements: This research was carried out with generous support from 
National Science Foundation DDIG–BCS–0819376, the Wenner Gren Foundation, 
and the Fulbright program. I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers and my 
dissertation committee for their insightful comments and recommendations for 
improving this manuscript. I also thank my field assistants, colleagues at INP, and 
all the Ecuadorian cockle collectors who made this study possible. 
1. Introduction
Recent scholarship in sustainability science draws attention to the role of 
collective action and common property institutional arrangements in the study of 
social-ecological systems (Ostrom 1990; Kurien 1995; Berkes et al. 1998; Bray 
et al. 2004; Berkes 2005). Common property scholars have long maintained that 
collective action and strong local institutions can play an instrumental role in 
resource conservation, stewardship, or management (McCay and Acheson 1987; 
Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990; Smith and Berkes 1991; Bromley 1992; Smith and 
Berkes 1993; Feeny et al. 1996; Agrawal 2001; Bray et al. 2004; Rebellon 2004). 
The collective action behind common property arrangements has the potential 
to serve as a mechanism for averting Garrett Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the 
commons” if individuals successfully organize, cooperate, communicate, and trust 
one another for the benefit of resources and equitable distribution. Since the debut 
of Ostrom’s influential book Governing the Commons: Evolution of Institutions 
for Collective Action (1990) outlining eight design principles for the governance 
of common pool resources, several case studies have applied the framework in an 
attempt to strengthen propositions about the sustainable management of resources 
(McCay and Acheson 1987; Acheson 1989; Gibson et al. 2000; Agrawal 2001; 
Bray et al. 2003). One of the main contributions of this research has emphasized 
the importance of local actors and institutions, which has particular relevance 
to recent paradigm shifts in coastal and fisheries management from “top-down” 
to “participatory” co-management policies that empower local communities as 
legitimate stakeholders (see Pomeroy 1995; Guest 1999).
While studies of common property have provided valuable insights into the 
internal processes of social organization, few have examined the outcomes most 
pertinent to the concept of sustainability. Questions still remain about the inherent 
assumptions of environmental stewardship implied by much of the common 
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property literature (Ruttan 1998; Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder 1999; Lu 2001; 
Pollnac and Johnson 2005), especially since too often, little attention is given 
to ecology in relation to property rights (Berkes 1996). Only with the exception 
of a few studies (for example, see Acheson 1987; Smith and Berkes 1991; Bray 
et al. 2004), the direct link between social arrangements and the environment 
remains poorly understood, especially pertaining to the management of common 
pool resources (Anderies et al. 2004), and despite calls in the policy arena to 
understand the human dimensions of environmental change (National Research 
Council 1999).
In this paper, I employ Ostrom’s (2011) Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (IAD) to investigate the link between social processes 
that have contributed to mangrove wetland recovery, and how the outcome of 
certain local institutional arrangements contributes to the sustainability of the 
mangrove cockle fishery (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis) on the Ecuadorian 
coast. Given concerns about overexploitation of mangrove cockles in the last 10 
years (Elao and Guevara 2006; Mora and Moreno 2009; Mora et al. 2009) and 
its possible relationship to larger landscape processes of mangrove deforestation 
for the expansion of shrimp farming (Ocampo-Thomason 2006), the primary goal 
of this study is to assess the role of custodias, ten-year concessions granted by 
the State to local associations for community-based stewardship and sustainable 
management of mangrove resources. At the time of this research, the Ecuadorian 
State has granted concessions to 34 communities in all five coastal provinces, with 
the majority concentrated in the provinces of El Oro and Esmeraldas. Working in 
partnership with an external institution for technical assistance, local associations 
have been able to petition for a 10-year concession since the year 2000 by providing 
maps, a copy of the association’s agreement, a list of members, designated officers, 
and a management plan detailing the “sustainable use of resources” (Bravo 2007), 
often guided by rules highly reflective of Ostrom’s (1990) design principles. 
This study is confined to two specific questions. First, how do custodias, as a 
common property regime, promote environmental stewardship and sustainability 
in a social, ecological and economic sense? Second, does the common property 
regime and local valuation of that system suggest a viable institutional framework 
upon which to base conservation and management initiatives? The general aim of 
this study is to link social and ecological systems and explore the management 
implications for mangrove fisheries.
Globally distributed throughout tropical coastal areas, mangrove wetlands 
supply a variety of goods to coastal communities such as fuelwood, commercial 
timber, charcoal, construction materials, thatch, fish, mollusks, crustaceans, 
medicinals, tannin, honey, incense, paper, and dyes for cloth (Snedaker 1986; 
Kovacs 1998; Mera Orcés 1999; Kaplowitz 2001; Glaser 2003; Walters et al. 
2008). In addition to the goods for direct human use, mangrove wetlands are 
increasingly recognized for their multiple environmental services: nutrient cycling, 
erosion control, sediment trapping, groundwater recharge, water purification, 
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storm surge/tsunami buffering, carbon sequestration, microclimate stabilization, 
and essential habitat, shelter, and nursery service for commercial, recreational, 
and subsistence fisheries (Ronnback 1999; Brander et al. 2006).  Due to their 
previous stigmatization as unproductive “barren wastelands” (Selvam et al. 2003: 
794) and a general lack of understanding about their environmental services, 
mangrove wetlands worldwide have been undervalued, often leading to their 
draining for agriculture, urbanization, and tourism or conversion to other uses 
(Valiela et al. 2001; Alongi 2002). While the deforestation rates of mangroves are 
generally decreasing, they still remain significantly higher than other forest types 
(FAO 2005). According to Valiela et al. (2001), mariculture contributes to about 
52% of global mangrove loss and shrimp farming is the most significant type of 
aquaculture associated with mangrove deforestation.
The vulnerability of mangroves to destruction further reflects global policies 
and institutions that have favored export-oriented development like shrimp farming 
over local tradeoffs (Martinez-Alier 2001). While shrimp mariculture offers the 
potential for economic development by increasing export earnings and generating 
employment in urban centers, the local reality in marginalized coastal communities 
has been dramatic landscape change and decreasing water quality (Southgate 
and Whitaker 1994; Dewalt et al. 1996; Cruz-Torres 2000; Barbier 2003; Stram 
et al. 2005). Along with ecological degradation, mangrove deforestation has also 
resulted in numerous social impacts such as community displacement, the loss of 
livelihoods, the erosion of resource rights, the reorganization of local economies, 
and an increase in economic disparity and social conflict (Stonich 1995; Dewalt 
et al. 1996; Primavera 1997; Cruz-Torres 2000; Stonich and Vandergeest 2001; 
C-CONDEM 2007). In some places around the world, including Ecuador, 
resistance movements have emerged in defense of mangroves (Cruz-Torres 2000; 
Stonich and Bailey 2000; Martinez-Alier 2001). 
According to the IAD framework, it is necessary to identify the structural 
variables (biophysical conditions, attributes of community, and rules-in use) that 
provide the context for the emergence of particular “action situations” and how 
the outcomes of those actions, in turn, feed back into the context, causing shifts in 
the structure. In Ecuador, after decades of mangrove clearing associated shrimp 
aquaculture (CLIRSEN-PMRC 2007), shrimp has risen to one of the top exports, 
despite set-backs in production due to White Spot Syndrome Virus (WSSV), 
a disease in cultured shrimp that devastated the industry in 1999. I argue that 
these events, along with both global and Ecuadorian resistance movements in 
defense of mangroves, and their consolidation into new civil society institutions, 
have partially served as a catalyst for the policy changes in the late 1990s that 
recognized the ancestral rights of local communities to mangroves and granted 
custodias to the first local associations in Esmeraldas and El Oro by the year 2000. 
In this paper, I focus on the mangrove concessions and their effects on the cockle 
fishery as the “action situations” that have contributed to the reversal of trends 
in mangrove cover from deforestation to reforestation and changed the nature of 
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property relations among mangrove cockle collectors, thereby affecting the state 
of the resource.
Isla Costa Rica, El Oro, Ecuador, one of the study sites for this research, was 
one of the first communities to receive a custodia in the year 2000 (Figure 1). 
The management plan has two main objectives: 1) mangrove conservation and 
restoration; 2) specific guidelines for the sustainable management of the cockle 
fishery (Bravo 2006). With regard to the first objective, each socio (member of the 
local association) is expected to report encroachment by expanding shrimp farms 
to the appropriate authorities and participate in periodic reforestation projects. 
While local mangrove restoration projects by 34 local associations throughout 
the coast are unlikely to make a big impact on a national scale, there are other 
institutions working toward the recovery of mangrove systems. As pointed 
out by Berkes (2005; 2006), the scaling up of local processes is particularly 
challenging for coastal and marine resources, but local institutions can reduce 
their vulnerability to external threats by engaging in cross-scale collaborations, 
such as co-management and social movement networks (Berkes 2002). Through 
the new cross-scale collaborations, changes in Ecuador have been implemented 
at multiple levels for broader-scale impacts. The new Presidential Decree 1391 
(passed in March of 2010) is designed to regulate the shrimp industry and requires 
shrimp farmers to relinquish a certain percentage of their ponds to the government 
for the recuperation of lost mangrove habitat. Shrimp farmers sponsor reforestation 
projects carried out by local associations and other sectors of civil society. These 
processes, in turn, are also expected to further alter the biophysical variables that 
provide the context for mangrove fisheries and the institutions that govern them.
A central concern of this study has been about the impact of mangrove loss 
on artisanal fisheries such as the mangrove cockle, a bivalve mollusk locally 
known as concha prieta in Ecuador and piangua in Colombia. Cockles have a 
broad range throughout mangrove-covered areas in Pacific littoral zone from 
Mexico to Peru (MacKenzie 2001), and high cultural and economic value in the 
mangrove communities of Ecuador and Colombia (Mera Orcés 1999; Rebellon 
2004; Ocampo-Thomason 2006; Ecobiotec 2009; Kuhl and Sheridan 2009). It 
is traditionally harvested for subsistence by women and children in the Afro-
Ecuadorian communities of Esmeraldas province, and by men and young boys 
throughout the rest of the country. The earliest records of its commercialization 
date back to a fisheries census conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Pesca (INP) 
in the 1970s (INP 1971). As a stationary resource, it is particularly vulnerable to 
habitat destruction and overexploitation. Studies have shown declining catches 
and shell sizes throughout the Ecuadorian coast in the last decade (Elao and 
Guevara 2006; Mora and Moreno 2009; Mora et al. 2009). The Subsecretaría de 
Recursos Pesqueros (SRP) established the first measures to regulate the fishery 
in 2001 by Ministerial Agreement No. 170 which recommended a closed season 
during the period of reproduction from February 15 to March 31, along with 
a prohibition of capturing shells smaller than 45 mm. The closed season was 
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difficult to enforce and ended in 2008. The updated Ministerial Agreement No. 
005 has called for the ratification and enforcement of regulations regarding the 
commercialization of shells below 45 mm. Since July 2008, SRP inspectors are 
increasingly being stationed in major disembarkation areas to randomly monitor 
the fishery by confiscating shells smaller than 45 mm and returning them to their 
habitat. However, this form of control does little to prevent collectors from hiding 
small shells in their backpacks or clothing and the fishery continues to decline. 
As a common pool resource, the fishery is challenged generally by the problem of 
subtractability, or multiple users compromising one another’s ability to maximize 
his/her share, and exclusion, or the difficulty of limiting resource use by the 
exclusion of outsiders (Ostrom et al. 1999; Berkes 2005).
With regard to managing the fishery in Isla Costa Rica, the second objective of 
the custodia’s management plan has designated certain areas for periodic closure, 
rotation, monitoring, controls, and vigilance. Similar to some of the design 
principles described by Ostrom (1990), maps of the concessions have clearly 
defined the boundaries of the custodias (Principle 1). Second, all socios have made 
collective choice arrangements to abide by the rules regulating the allowable size 
(45 mm) and the monthly closure of certain areas to allow ecological processes 
such as larval dispersal, settlement, and growth (Principles 2 and 3). Third, a 
rotating guard system is obligatory to prevent access by outsiders (Principle 4). 
Fourth, those who fail to fulfill the guard obligations are sanctioned by losing their 
privileges to the closed areas during harvest periods, with the penalty increasing 
upon multiple offenses (Principle 5). Fifth, conflicts between socios are resolved 
in monthly association meetings and intruding outsiders are reported to the 
local authorities in Hualtaco (Principle 6). Finally, these tenure rights exist for a 
10-year period with potential for renewal from the Ministry of Environment 
Forestry Department, and up until the time of this study, socios from Isla Costa 
Rica have enjoyed immunity from cockle confiscation by SRP authorities in 
Hualtaco (Principle 7).  
Other fisheries internally regulated along similar lines have shown social, 
economic, and ecological benefits for those involved (Acheson 1987). However, 
small-scale, locally-managed fisheries are still vulnerable to exogenous forces 
such as economic shifts, policy changes, or demographic changes (Thomas 
2001; Curran and Agardy 2002; Acheson and Brewer 2003; Cinner 2005). In 
community-based natural resource management and co-management situations, 
it is not only necessary to study the institutional arrangements that promote 
sustainable catches, but also examine the local valuation of such management 
regimes to assess its social viability and potential persistence in spite of external 
forces that undermine their effectiveness. In Ecuador, as the mangrove landscape 
recovers simultaneously with the expansion of new institutions favoring local 
involvement and empowerment, there is opportunity to explore the three tenets of 
sustainability. The presence of a variety of management regimes in the study areas 
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of El Oro allows for the testing of hypotheses about the effectiveness of different 
management strategies in a social, ecological, and economic sense. 
In the following sections, I will present results that illustrate the relationship 
between the institutional arrangements of the custodia in Isla Costa Rica and 
their effects on the resource through a comparative analysis of three types of 
management regimes: 1) Custodia Managed Fishery, areas tightly managed 
by rotation and fishery closures in Isla Costa Rica; 2) Custodia Open Fishery, 
areas of the concession in which the fishery is not tightly managed because of 
limited resources (human capital, lack of boats and money for gas); 3) Absence of 
Custodias, areas outside the concession frequented by collectors from Isla Costa 
Rica, neighboring communities, and the Port of Hualtaco and where access is 
defined by a first-come, first-serve basis. I posit that the loosely organized social 
movements in defense of mangroves of the early 1990s partially contributed to 
establishment of custodias that today permit some collectors to reap social and 
economic benefits while compromising other collectors’ agency and ability to fish 
sustainably. I do not contend that custodias as a form of common property is a 
panacea for fishery management, but I argue it is an innovative policy intervention 
that has great potential to support local autonomy over resources while promoting 
community empowerment and healthy mangrove habitat for higher cockle catch 
shares and larger shell sizes. 
2. Methods
2.1. Study site
The research reported here was conducted in two study sites in the province of 
El Oro, Isla Costa Rica and Puerto Hualtaco (see Figure 2). Isla Costa Rica is a 
small fishing village of 310 inhabitants within a network of mangrove islands 
that form part of the Archipiélago Jambelí. The majority of households depend 
on mangrove resources for their livelihood and subsistence and 70% depend on 
cockle collecting. Almost half of all 70 households have one or more individuals 
collecting full time, 5–6 days a week, 2–4 hours per day. The daily fishing effort 
fluctuates between 15 and 30 collectors per day depending on tides and the lunar 
cycle, economic decisions, personal obligations, holidays, and health/physical 
wellbeing of the collector.1 Most collectors are between the ages 14 and 40, 
despite Ecuador’s labor laws that prohibit minors from working. But with access 
to secondary education 45 minutes away by boat and sometimes not accessible 
at all because of tides, those who have not migrated out to live in the nearest city 
of Huaquillas for study tend to work as fishers or cockle collectors on the island. 
Since many of them learn the activity at an early age, children as young as 6 
1
 Proyecto de Monitoreo Comunitario del Recurso Concha Prieta. Coordinado por Christine Beitl, 
Adolfo Cruz y Sonia Cruz, Isla Costa Rica, enero - junio de 2010 (Asociacion de Mariscadores 
Pescadores Artesanales y Afines “Costa Rica” 2010).
Cockles in custody 493
N
o 
cu
st
od
ia
s
N
o 
cu
st
od
ia
s
N
o 
cu
st
od
ia
s
C
us
to
di
a
of
 L
as
 H
ua
ca
s
M
an
ag
ed
 F
is
he
ry
C
us
to
di
a
O
pe
n 
Fi
sh
er
y
P
E
R
U
Fi
gu
re
 2
: P
ro
pe
rt
y 
Re
gi
m
es
 in
 Is
la
 C
os
ta
 R
ic
a 
a
n
d 
a
ro
u
n
d 
Pu
er
to
 H
ua
lta
co
. N
ot
e 
th
at
 th
e b
ou
nd
ar
y l
in
es
 a
ro
u
n
d 
th
e a
re
a
s 
o
f Is
la
 C
os
ta
 R
ic
a’
s 
cu
st
od
ia
 
a
re
 n
o
t d
efi
nit
ive
.
 
494 Christine M. Beitl
years old have been seen digging in the mud alongside their parents or siblings 
during school vacations. Few collectors are older than 60 because of the physical 
demands of the activity, spending hours wading through knee-deep mud and 
climbing over branches while maintaining a crouched position to duck through 
the maze of low-lying branches. Many residents engage in livelihood switching as 
an adaptation to seasonality in fisheries and economic demand. Very few of them 
have ever worked on the near-by shrimp farms, even just for the three-day harvest 
every three months. 
In Isla Costa Rica, there are two local associations, Asociación Costa Rica and 
Nueve de Octubre. Over 50% of collectors on the island are members of one of 
the two local associations. The majority who are not socios, are their wives and 
children under the age of 18. Asociación Costa Rica is in charge of the 579 hectare 
custodia and they have made arrangements to include two men from the other 
association who are primarily dedicated to full-time cockle collecting. Thirteen 
families practice cockle mariculture in holding pens of different sizes lined up in a 
creek directly front of their houses. Both associations have collectively-managed 
holding pens. Most collectors go out on a daily basis in one or two boats carrying 
10–15 passengers to an area, leaving 1–4 collectors in various spots along the 
estuary. Others go out alone or in small groups of 2–5 on foot or in their personal 
motor-powered canoes. Shells are held for 1–3 days before being brought to 
Hualtaco for sale. 
Puerto Hualtaco is the main landing site and jump-off point for collectors from 
the city of Huaquillas, about a ten-minute bus ride from the port. INP estimates 
an average daily fishing effort of 254 collectors per day distributed among 9–10 
motor boats and a few paddle canoes. Many shell collectors in Hualtaco are men or 
children of men originally from the rural mangrove communities in the archipelago 
who have migrated out within the last 1–2 decades to improve educational and 
employment opportunities for their families while maintaining their traditional 
livelihoods and identities as shell collectors. Others are migrants and children 
of migrants from the province of Loja in the Highlands whose migration to the 
coast is related to booming opportunities in the shrimp sector during the 1980s. 
The collectors are men ranging in age from 17–50. Being residents of an urban 
area, their livelihood switching is related to economic opportunities in other 
employment sectors that come and go. Some of them take up 3-day employment 
opportunities on the shrimp farms every 3 months for the harvest. One of the local 
associations has an agreement with a local shrimp farmer to secure those kinds of 
arrangements for the socios. Others may work in shrimp packing and processing 
facilities every 2 weeks during spring tides. There are five local associations 
predominantly made up of cockle collectors. Like the two associations in Isla 
Costa Rica, they are actively involved with larger-scale federations embedded 
within the national-level fisheries civil society organization, FENACOPEC, which 
in theory gives them access government institutions for greater participation, and 
in some cases, access to credit. The majority of collectors interviewed in Hualtaco 
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(n=33) work 5–6 days a week, joining one of the nine large boats carrying up to 
30 collectors into the archipelago as far as Isla Costa Rica. 
2.2. Data collection and analysis 
Initially, I explored social aspects of the fishery as part of an ethnographic study 
of cockle collectors for dissertation research carried out from January 2009 to 
December 2010 in the provinces of El Oro and Esmeraldas, Ecuador. After 3 
months of observations and exploratory interviews in the five major ports most 
important for cockle landings, and participant observation in Isla Costa Rica, I 
designed a semi-structured questionnaire to be administered in four sites, one 
large and one small community in each province.2  To control for geographical 
differences and because of the presence of custodias, only the results from the 
two El Oro sites are presented here and comparative references are qualitatively 
made to the Esmeraldas sites. The questionnaire was divided into five sections: 1) 
informed consent; 2) information about cockles, including observations of CPUE 
and shell sizes; 3) baseline demographic information; 4) perceptions of change 
in mangroves and the fishery; 5) participation in civil society activities, social 
movements, and other forms of collective action. 
In Isla Costa Rica, I interviewed collectors in their homes at their convenience 
and counted the total number of shells while measuring their length with a 150 
mm digital vernier caliper before or after the interview (21–170 shells/collector). 
Of the 58 cockle collectors interviewed, 41 had their CPUE measured, in some 
cases, more than once. On a data sheet, in addition to CPUE and shell size (mm), 
I recorded information about the site, time and resources spent, and the number 
of shells the collector planned to use for subsistence or as seed for their corral 
(mariculture holding pen). Additionally, I took four trips with different collectors 
to the gathering grounds for participant observation and also to test my own skills 
harvesting. All together, I interviewed 58 residents of Isla Costa Rica, including 
fishers, cockle collectors, and women, resulting in 69 observations that included 
both interview and CPUE data, including those who allowed me to measure their 
CPUE on different occasions from multiple harvest sites. 
In Puerto Hualtaco where the fast-paced pressures of market activity are 
much more intense, I carried out interviews in landing areas while two local 
field assistants measured all the shells of the catch (35–170 shells/collector) and 
recorded the data in a log sheet, which was later matched with the interview. 
Both members of local associations and independent collectors were randomly 
2
 Biologists from the Instituto Nacional de Pesca of Ecuador played an instrumental role in orienting 
me to different field sites, introducing me to research contacts, and advising me with general infor-
mation about the fishery throughout the duration of this research. INP is a public research institution 
whose mission is to provide the service of technical and scientific investigation to the fisheries-
aquaculture sector to inform policy for the sustainable development of the fisheries to achieve its 
“optimal rational use” (Mora, personal communication 2010).
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recruited with the help of cockle buyers and field assistants as they disembarked.3 
On a few occasions without local field assistants, colleagues from INP randomly 
selected informants and measured shells while I conducted interviews. Some 
of the interviews were recorded with a digital voice recorder. On one occasion, 
I accompanied a group of collectors to the gathering grounds for observation, 
but remaining in the boat with its owner, the president of the provincial-level 
federation of local associations in El Oro. All together, there were 33 interviews, 
in which only one did not include CPUE data.
Throughout the process of data collection, I presented results to informants 
on several occasions in Isla Costa Rica to invite feedback and generate further 
discussion. When data collection was finished, I organized two workshops in 
collaboration with INP to present their findings about the state of the fishery on 
a national level and the findings of my study at a more in-depth local level. Both 
associations in Costa Rica were invited to the first workshop held on the island. 
In Hualtaco, two representatives from each of the five associations and the larger 
federation were invited along with other socios and independent collectors who 
participated in my study. In addition to the individual interviews in Isla Costa 
Rica (n=58) and Puerto Hualtaco (n=33), the discussions at the workshop are 
particularly relevant to this study’s assessment of the social viability of the 
custodias as a management regime for the cockle fishery.  
In both sites, I confirmed with each informant that their sample was complete 
and not mixed with another collector’s. To prepare the data for analysis, 
samples suspected to have been measured improperly were first removed 
from the database. Since I failed to consistently clarify with the informant 
whether shells were removed for personal consumption or the corral during the 
early phases of the project, several cases were dropped for more conservative 
analysis. Only two of the observations in this analysis (n=102) were cases in 
which the CPUE had been mixed between two collectors; however, since this 
analysis is not concerned with individual-level characteristics that may bias 
shell catches and sizes, they are unlikely to affect the results. In only two cases 
in Isla Costa Rica, the collector reported to have already removed a marginal 
amount of small shells before CPUE measurement (7 and 10 shells) for his 
corral. To correct this problem, I adjusted the CPUE data by adding the number 
they reported to have removed, estimating shell size based on the lowest shell 
size of their catch. 
To test the claim that CPR arrangements are beneficial for resources, I 
examined the size frequency distribution of shells for the harvest sites, which 
were each coded and classified into one of the three types of property regimes: 
1) Custodia Managed Fishery; 2) Custodia Open Fishery; 3) No Custodias, 
including sites around both Isla Costa Rica and Puerto Hualtaco (see Figure 2). A 
positively-skewed size frequency distribution with central tendency concentrated 
3
 Of the 36 recruited in Puerto Hualtaco, only three declined to participate.
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in the lower range would indicate signs of overexploitation and stress. The 
differences in mean size of both species A. tuberculosa and A. similis by type 
of property regime were examined by carrying out a comparison of means test 
and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test (n=6565). I also compared the 
proportion of large shells to small shells by site for more robust results than those 
provided by average sizes alone, further illustrating descriptive information about 
the condition of the gathering grounds and the differences between them. A post 
hoc pair-wise comparison was then conducted to determine between which sites 
specifically the differences lie.
The institutional robustness of common property arrangements in relation to 
sustainability could be better understood by examining its social viability in addition 
to the impacts on the resource. In the interviews, I enquired about perceptions of 
change in the fishery, concerns about overexploitation, whether informants agree 
with the custodias, and whether they believe that everyone should have the right to 
work in mangroves. Data from semi-structured interviews were coded into dummy 
variables to calculate the percentage of responses in agreement with the topics of 
enquiry and later to compare whether differences in opinions could be explained by 
field site, comparing Isla Costa Rica and Hualtaco. I employed a two-way measure of 
association cross-tabulation to test for significant differences between the two sites.
3. Results
The distribution of A. tuberculosa shell sizes differs significantly depending of 
the type of management regime from which they were harvested (Figure 3). The 
areas of the custodia in which the fishery is managed by periodic closures and 
rotation between sites have a normal distribution of shell sizes with low skewness, 
indicating that some collectors are harvesting small shells and not abiding by the 
rules concerning the minimum allowable size for commercialization. The other 
two areas within and outside the custodia where the fishery is not managed and 
open on a first-come, first-serve basis, are more similar in their distribution of shell 
sizes. The positive skew of those two types of management regimes indicates that 
shells extracted from “open-access” situations in which with fishery is not managed 
tend to be smaller in size, thereby supporting the hypothesis that areas where the 
fishery is not managed are more likely to exhibit signs of overexploitation.
In addition to shell size, the average number of shells harvested per hour also 
differed significantly between the three property regimes (Figure 4). In the fishery-
managed areas of the custodia, collectors are able to harvest 34 shells per hour. In 
the areas of the custodia not managed for the fishery, collectors harvest an average 
of 28 shells her hour, closer in average to nearby open-access around Isla Costa 
Rica and Hualtaco (26 shells per hour). Since the average number of shells per hour 
did not have a normal distribution in all three sites, I used non-parametric tests to 
evaluate whether those differences were significant. The Kruskal–Wallis test showed 
significant differences between the different types of management regimes (n=98, 
χ2=6.031, df=2, p=0.049). To test specifically between which management regimes 
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Figure 3: Size frequency distribution of A. tuberculosa captured from three types of management 
regimes in El Oro, Ecuador (n=6565). There are significant differences in shell sizes between 
the three types of management regimes (F=61.665) and (p=0.000).
the differences lie, I employed a Wilcoxon rank-sum test recommended for non-
normally distributed data (Table 1). As suspected, the most significant differences 
lie between the parts of the custodia where the fishery is managed according to strict 
rules of rotation and access (group 1) and the open-access areas around outside the 
custodia that are accessed on a first-come, first-serve basis (group 3).
Finally, the results of this study suggest that there is a relationship between 
resources and the social arrangements that govern them, thereby supporting my 
hypothesis about the role of common property arrangements in the sustainable 
management of mangrove cockles (Table 2). In the areas of Isla Costa Rica’s 
custodia that are rotated around closure periods of 6–30 days, one is more likely 
to harvest a slightly higher quantity and larger shells than in the open-access 
areas both within and around the custodia. Moreover, those areas of the custodia 
have a higher abundance of large shells in proportion to small shells.4 A post-
hoc 2-sample t-test confirmed significant differences between each of the paired 
4
 For purposes of simplification, this ratio was calculated only for A. tuberculosa since it is ecologi-
cally more abundant in many of the harvest areas and culturally more important. 
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sites for each variable at a level of 0.000 for all variables except CPUE <36 mm 
(p=0.004). 
The second proposition, that custodias are not only beneficial for the resource 
but also for the community of resource users, is only partially supported by the 
results here (Table 3). In both sites, Isla Costa Rica and Hualtaco, the majority 
of informants agreed that over the last 10 years, the cockle fishery has been 
declining, making their work more difficult. Over 90% of the informants in both 
sites were concerned about overexploitation and the possibility that this resource 
will soon become economically extinct. However, not all informants agreed the 
reasons for overexploitation or potential solutions, particularly with regard to 
custodias. 
In both Isla Costa Rica and Hualtaco, informants were concerned about the 
loss of gathering grounds, but there were significant differences in their opinions 
about the reasons for the loss of those areas. In Isla Costa Rica, 31% attributed 
the loss of gathering grounds to shrimp farms while only 3% in Hualtaco cited 
that as the primary cause. In contrast, 80% of collectors interviewed in Hualtaco 
S
he
lls
 p
er
 h
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r
Management regime
Custodia managed fishery Custodia open fishery No custodias
Figure 4: The number of shells gathered per hour differs significantly between the three property 
regimes: 34/hour in the managed areas of Isla Costa Rica, 28/hour in the areas of the custodia 
where the fishery is not managed and 26/hour in open access areas around Hualtaco and Isla 
Costa Rica (n=98, χ2=6.031, df=2, p=0.049). 
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Table 1: Results of non-parametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in the 
number of shells harvested per hour according to the type of management regime
Comparison of average shells/hour between 
management regimes
Difference between 
means (shells/hour)
n z-test p-value
Custodia managed fishery and custodia open 
fishery (groups 1, 2)
6 50 –1.536 0.124
Custodia managed fishery and no custodias 
(groups 1, 3)
8 66 –2.462 0.014*
Custodia open fishery and no custodias 
(groups 2, 3)
2 80 –0.933 0.351
Significance indicated by * at 0.05 level.
attributed the loss of gathering grounds to custodias, while 52% recognized that as 
a problem in Isla Costa Rica. Not surprisingly, in Isla Costa Rica, 100% of those 
interviewed were in favor of the custodias, even though they had lost some of 
their gathering grounds to the concession of the near-by community Las Huacas 
(see Figure 2). 
Collectors in Hualtaco had conflicting opinions about custodias. Generally 
there was a widespread perception of benefits among those affiliated with 
associations and others who may have experienced larger shell and catch sizes 
first-hand by trespassing. Despite the perception of benefits, many informants in 
Hualtaco felt they were running out of places to harvest shells. Finally, when 
asked if everyone should have the right to work in mangroves, the “yes” response 
was significantly higher in Hualtaco than in Isla Costa Rica with answers like, 
“yes, we are all Ecuadorians” and “of course, how can anyone make themselves 
an owner of mangroves?”
4. Discussion
4.1. Benefits of common property arrangements for the resource
The results of this study confirm some of the assumptions that the common 
property literature has made about the stewardship of resources. The findings 
illustrate that shell and capture sizes are significantly related to the ways in 
which the cockle fishery is managed. The arrangements outlined in Isla Costa 
Rica’s management plan reflect one way of dealing with the challenges of 
governing common pool resources: subtractability and exclusion (see Ostrom 
et al. 1999). The results confirm that the design principles governing common 
pool resources are beneficial for the state of the resource as a relatively closed 
system, open only to members of the Asociación Isla Costa Rica. In the areas of 
Isla Costa Rica’s custodia that are rotated around closure periods of 6–30 days, 
one is more likely to harvest a slightly higher quantity and larger shells than 
in the open-access areas both within and around the custodia. Moreover, those 
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areas of the custodia have a higher abundance of large shells in proportion to 
small shells. Therefore, a collector may be driven by economic incentives to 
harvest and respect the rules of those areas since larger shells are considered 
by buyers to be “better quality” and sell for a higher price on the market. Since 
the socios perceive social, ecological, and economic benefits, they have further 
incentive to cooperate along the lines of the collective choice arrangements they 
have agreed upon as a group. While the rules concerning the extraction of small 
shells below the size limit of 45 mm is written into the management plan and 
largely understood by socios, there is no enforcement of these rules; rather, it is 
enforced by an honor system. Many collectors do not take small shells not only 
for ecological reasons and their understanding of ecological processes of larval 
dispersion and growth rates, but also because small shells are more difficult to 
sell. They may only harvest a handful of small shells to “completar,” or reach a 
round number since the price is determined by number and size rather than by 
actual weight. 
While personal economic incentives for not harvesting small shells other than 
as seed for the corral or to “completar” were not directly addressed in this analysis, 
the social repercussions for not following the rules may be just as compelling. 
This is demonstrated by the high levels of cooperation around the rotating guard 
system. Everyday, two of the forty socios are obligated to lose a day’s work on 
a rotating basis to sit in a boat in front of Isla del Puerco, an ideal location for 
monitoring the five fishery-managed harvest sites of the custodia. Those who 
deflect from this obligation are sanctioned by not being allowed to participate in 
the harvest of the areas during the open periods. For each offense, the sanctions 
become more severe, eventually resulting in his permanent exclusion from the 
Table 3: Percent of informants that agree with various statements concerning the social viability 
of custodias as a management regime for the mangrove cockle fishery in Isla Costa Rica and 
Hualtaco
Isla Costa 
Rica
Hualtaco Two-way cross-tabulation 
measures of association
Mean n Mean n χ2 p-value*
Perceived difference in the cockle fishery over 
the last 10 years
100% 33 94% 32 2.128 0.145
Concern about over exploitation 97% 37 91% 32 1.399 0.237
Conflict with another cockle collector 61% 31 38% 32 3.566 0.059
Conflict with shrimp farmer 40% 30 65% 31 3.674 0.055
Harvest areas lost in general 93% 29 97% 32 0.463 0.496
Gathering grounds lost to shrimp farms 31% 29 3% 30 8.038 0.005*
Gathering grounds lost to custodias 52% 29 80% 30 5.261 0.022*
Perceived benefits of custodias 100% 30 79% 28 7.170 0.007*
Universal rights to mangrove resources 79% 24 97% 29 3.954 0.047*
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monthly harvests. According to the president of the association, no one has ever 
violated the rule more than once. 
An alternative explanation for the significant differences in shell sizes between 
the types of management regimes may be reflective of ecological processes 
independent of human interaction beyond the scope of this study. For example, 
A. tuberculosa prefers harder soils characteristic of older, more well-established 
mangrove forests while the abundance of A. similis is more attributed to soft, 
saturated mud characteristic of young mangrove colonies. Furthermore, collectors 
have their “ecological” preferences about sites, which further contributes to 
differences between sites and fishing effort. 
Another explanation for the differences in shell sizes between the types of 
management regimes could be explained by the fishing effort, the number of 
collectors on a given day. The data show a gradual decline in shell size and the 
number of shells captured per hour with the fishery-managed areas of the custodia 
ranked first (Group 1), the open-fishery areas of the custodia ranked second (Group 
2), and the open-access areas around Isla Costa Rica and Hualtaco ranked third 
(Group 3). While the t-test (for shell size) indicates that the shell size differences 
are significant between all of the pairs, the more conservative z-test (for shells per 
hour) illustrates that the differences between groups 1 and 2 and the differences 
between groups 2 and 3 were insignificant. According to the z-test, the significant 
differences in the number of shells harvested per hour lie between the fishery-
managed custodias (Group 1) and open-access areas outside the custodia (Group 
3). This may suggest that group 2 is a hybrid regime, although it is technically 
just as much “open-access” for cockle collecting as any of the other areas around 
Hualtaco and open to anyone on a first-come, first-serve basis. Possible reasons 
why the averages in the second group seem to be a middle ground could be 
attributed to a lower fishing effort, given its distance from Puerto Hualtaco. On 
the other hand, the lower fishing effort in the non-fishery-managed areas of the 
custodia could be attributed to political boundaries established by the concession. 
Generally, after ten years asserting their territorial rights over their custodia, 
the areas in concession are generally respected by collectors from Hualtaco. 
Trespassing is not very common even though there would be no sanctions in the 
open fishery areas of the custodia. If the latter explanation is the case, then it lends 
further support for the assertion that custodias are beneficial to mangrove fisheries 
by the successful delineation and assertion of boundaries. 
One final point worth mentioning is that all shells harvested by collectors from 
Isla Costa Rica would be significantly larger on average if it weren’t for the corrals. 
Those who have corrals collect small cockles as seed, justifying the exploitation 
of shells below the legal size limit with the approval of other socios, although not 
all agree with the practice of cockle mariculture particularly for concerns about 
overexploitation. Practicing cockle mariculture is essentially an individualistic 
endeavor rather than a collective action which could potentially undermine the 
sustainability of the cockle fishery in Isla Costa Rica if too many families establish 
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their own holding pens collecting small shells as “seed” (Beitl 2010). Currently, 
only 13 families have their own corral and some harvest them as few times as 
twice a year when demand is highest during Christmas and Easter holidays. Other 
users may harvest them more frequently (once every three months), or a handful 
on a weekly basis to completar when work days are unfruitful. 
4.2. Social implications of common property arrangements for mangrove 
fisheries
As these results show, the benefits of the custodias are widely perceived by both 
collectors in Isla Costa Rica and to some degree by the collectors in Hualtaco. 
For the people in Isla Costa Rica, the custodias have allowed them to defend their 
livelihoods, traditions, identity, and the ecosystems upon which their families have 
depended for generations. By their 2005 mid-term evaluation, strengthening local 
organization and mangrove recovery were two of the outcomes listed as successful 
in the report (Bravo 2007). In the interviews, many expressed satisfaction with the 
perceived economic benefits. Naturally, a healthy habitat with more productive 
cockle harvest areas is beneficial to the resource users, but only for those who 
have access. Socios from Isla Costa Rica have access to gathering grounds that 
allow them to harvest an average of 8 more shells per hour than collectors from 
Hualtaco. This implies a significant increase in income of 30–40% based on a 
3-hour work period and an average total CPUE of 86.  Moreover, since the shells 
in those gathering grounds are larger, they can sell them for a higher price on 
the market. It also suggests that their work is easier for them, in that they can 
gather the same amount of shells in less time, allowing them enjoy their leisure 
time or dedicate themselves to another activity such as fishing, which potentially 
increases their income even further. Thus, the socios in Isla Costa Rica are very 
satisfied with the economic benefits of the custodias, providing further incentive 
to cooperate around the use of the resource and respect the rules governing their 
mangrove areas in custody. 
In addition to highly localized benefits, Isla Costa Rica’s experience with the 
concession has generated pride and a sense of ownership that contradicts what 
many other shell collectors believe are universal rights to work in mangroves, 
“as long as you do not destroy them,” as the shrimp farming industry has done. 
Despite the existence of laws that have protected mangroves, between 1969 and 
2006, the original mangrove cover decreased by 26.5%, correlating with the 
growth of shrimp farming (CLIRSEN-PMRC 2007). The first shrimp farms in 
Ecuador were built in the salt flats and uplands during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Often compared to “gold-rush fever” in other parts of the developing world (Cruz-
Torres 2000; Jermyn 2000), the shrimp industry in Ecuador expanded rapidly in 
both geographical extent and political power, disrupting environmental services 
and displacing artisanal fishers while producing one of the nation’s most important 
exports. Artisanal fishers with little political power or economic resources could 
do very little but to stand by and watch their fishing grounds be bulldozed away. 
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Between 1969 and 1995, the Archipiélago Jambelí lost almost half of its original 
mangrove cover to shrimp aquaculture (Bravo 2006). While local employment 
on shrimp farms tends to be seasonal and temporary, other sectors in packing, 
processing, and transportation boomed throughout the 1990s, mobilizing the 
migration of people to rural fishing villages and urban centers where the industry 
thrived. Urban centers like Muisne and Huaquillas benefited from the boom until 
1999 when WSSV devastated the industry, closing hatcheries, processing and 
packing plants, and halting infrastructural development. Many people displaced 
by the crash of the shrimp industry in 1999 had no other choice in a precarious 
economic situation but to take up artisanal fishing until other employment became 
available. Between the degraded mangrove habitats and increased number of 
collectors, artisanal fisheries like that of the mangrove cockle, began to decline. 
Custodias have provided the appropriate legal backing for local communities with 
little economic and political power to defend the resources and environments 
upon which their families have depended for generations, resulting in stronger 
local institutions and empowerment.
Now the very custodias that were established to defend the resource rights of 
ancestral communities serve as a new form of enclosure that denies fishing territory 
to those not affiliated with local associations. In the two study sites in El Oro, the 
incidence of conflict between shell collectors was higher than the two study sites 
in Muisne where there are no custodias (Beitl 2011). In the early years of Costa 
Rica’s custodia, conflicts among collectors from Hualtaco were more frequent as 
they were trying to assert their territory. Now, ten years after the granting of the 
concession, many of the collectors from Hualtaco have amicable relations with 
Isla Costa Rica, but continue to have conflicts with newly establishing custodias 
of Las Huacas and Pongalillo. Some informants in Hualtaco even attributed the 
decline of cockles directly to the problem of custodias. While in the past, gathering 
grounds were lost to shrimp ponds, today, collectors in Hualtaco are concerned 
about the loss of territory to custodias which are “spreading like a fever in the 
province of El Oro since now, everyone seems to be asking (the government) for 
a concession” (Mora, personal communication).
4.3. Broader implications of common property for mangrove conservation 
and recovery
“Scaling up” the common property arrangements by granting custodias to several 
coastal communities presents new challenges, as argued by Berkes (2005). 
This is especially true of Ecuador’s coastal zone, which like many others, is a 
heterogeneous social-ecological landscape characterized by diverse institutions 
and overlapping jurisdictions (Jentoft 2000). This case study of the custodias 
in El Oro is a good example of how local institutions can be strengthened by 
cross-scale interaction (Berkes 2002) and represents a step in the direction of 
understanding complexity and implementing integrated coastal management in 
Ecuador (Robadue 1995; Olsen and Christie 2000; Olsen et al. 2003; Christie 
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2005). On a larger scale beyond the common property arrangements of the 
mangrove fishery within the custodia, each socio is obligated to defend and 
participate in mangrove reforestation projects. Since the establishment of Isla 
Costa Rica’s concession in the year 2000, there have been two offenses by a 
local shrimp farmer wishing to expand his operation. As a “nested enterprise” 
(Ostrom’s design principle 8), members of the association worked with local 
authorities, non-government organizations, and the Universidad Técnica de 
Machala (their partner institution) to press charges and later replant the mangrove 
areas that were cleared, thereby further promoting healthy mangrove habitat 
for more productive fisheries beyond the boundaries of their custodia. These 
pockets of community-based conservation are likely to be occurring in the other 
34 custodias on the Ecuadorian coast. 
Overall, the granting of mangrove concessions to local associations has 
been part of a slight shift in the broader political economic structure that has 
traditionally favored shrimp exports over local artisanal fisheries, resulting in 
widespread welfare impacts for the coastal communities where mangroves were 
cleared for shrimp farming. What started out as loosely organized grassroots 
resistance movements by activists and poor fishers with few resources in defense 
of mangroves, eventually consolidated into new civil society organizations, local 
fishing associations and cooperatives, multi-tiered institutional interactions, and 
the policy changes that gave rise to custodias throughout the country. These 
outcomes provide further feedback into the context, contributing to the recovery 
of mangroves in some areas, the strengthening of local communities and civil 
society, and new collaborations between institutions, which will eventually 
mobilize new action situations. 
5. Conclusion
The establishment of community-managed mangrove concessions may represent a 
potential solution to a crisis of overexploitation of mangrove fisheries in Ecuador, 
but could result in what Martinez-Alier (2001) referred to as a “tragedy of 
enclosures” ironically in reference to shrimp farming. As independent collectors 
and socios without concessions are increasingly losing their ground, their ability 
to harvest shells sustainably is compromised, possibly deflecting problems of 
overexploitation to open-access areas where shell sizes are significantly smaller, 
as this study has demonstrated. In order for these new local institutions to endure 
climate change and other exogenous forces, the issue of conflict between user 
groups will have to be addressed. On the other hand, Ecuador’s mangrove 
concessions represent one of the many valiant innovations to restore degraded 
coastal wetlands and improve the productivity of the artisanal fisheries that 
depend on healthy mangrove habitat. Communities that benefit from the mangrove 
concessions are empowered by the process and gaining more local autonomy over 
their resources in the face of broader social, economic, and environmental changes 
that continuously threaten to undermine their livelihoods, identity, and wellbeing. 
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The co-management arrangements allow local associations to interact with other 
institutions at multiple scales for greater participation and reinforcement of 
ancestral rights to mangrove resources. 
Combining social and ecological methods is a useful tool for assessing 
sustainability. The IAD framework is moving in this direction beyond institutional 
analysis towards a broader understanding of social-ecological systems (Ostrom 
2011). This study’s application of the IAD framework, confirms certain kinds of 
social arrangements can promote sustainable resource use on a local level, while 
also identifying certain vulnerabilities. This is particularly important considering 
that much of the literature still focuses on the negative anthropogenic impacts 
on the environment instead of interactions considered beneficial, dynamic, and 
adaptive from a social-ecological systems perspective (McCay and Acheson 
1987; Berkes et al. 1998; Bray et al. 2004). One limitation of this research is 
that it has only been able to qualitatively speculate about the role of these local-
level processes as they relate to the broader mangrove landscape. Further analysis 
should more systematically examine the relationship between these local-level 
processes and broader patterns of landscape change as Bray and others have done 
in Mexico (2003). Similar research endeavors that attempt to study the direct link 
between social and ecological systems at multiple scales call for interdisciplinary 
action and collaboration under the same theoretical framework. Such research in 
sustainability science not only advances theories that integrate social and natural 
sciences, but also provides useful analytical tools for sustainable development 
and conservation policy (Kates et al. 2001). 
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